
Bayesian Statistics and its Applications

Reed Watson Physics 290E Fall 2017



Introduction

- Motivation
- Review of statistics
- Basics of Frequentist vs. Bayesian interpretations
- Pros and cons
- Nuisance parameters
- MCMC
- Examples

Motivation


- Bayesian statistics is an increasingly popular, though contentious, statistical interpretation.
- There exists confusion between Frequentist and Bayesian intervals.
- Full Bayesian treatment has been used in branching ratio studies at CDF [11], Higgs cross section limits [12], supersymmetry constraints[13].

Reverend Bayes. Source: wikipedia.org



Machinery of Statistics -Hypothesis Testing

- 2 or more hypotheses: H_0 , H_1 , etc. Falsely reject H_0 with frequency α (*significance level*), False reject H_1 with frequency β (1- β is the *power*)[1].
- Perform an experiment, obtain data *x*. *Test statistic* t(x): characterizes deviation of x from expectation.
 - Neyman-Pearson Lemma: Likelihood ratio λ is the most powerful test statistic, but often impractical with highly correlated data.
- Significance test: $f(t | H_0)$ is determined by data.
 - \circ α , β , are determined beforehand, p is an outcome of the experiment.
 - $p < \alpha$ is criterion for rejection of H₀
- Parameter determination-> **O** to be determined.
- Want an estimator for O as well as a measure of uncertainty around it (in the case of a positive result), or simply an upper bound for a null result.



 $p = \int_{t}^{t} f(t|H_0)dt$

Probability and Intervals

Frequentist:

- P(A) means that identically repeating an experiment an infinite number of times, event A is observed with frequency P(A).
- Frequentist *confidence interval*: True observable
 Θ. Based on data, we set a "confidence interval," which contains Θ with a frequency (1-α).
- **α**: *significance level.* Typically either .1 or .05 for parameter estimation.

Bayesian:

- P(A) quantifies the reasonable expectation that event A will occur given all available information.
- Credible interval: Θ belongs to a probability (belief) distribution. Based on the observed data a fraction (1-α) of the distribution is within the interval.
- *prior* (*π*) and *posterior* (*P*) distributions
 reflect our belief about a variable before
 and after the experiment
- Based on Bayes Theorem:

More on Bayes Theorem

Why isn't the likelihood function it's own inverse?

Medical Example: Some test for a disease has a 10% false positive rate. The disease is incident in 1% of population. You test positive for the disease. How likely is it that you actually have the disease?

A: 0.1 * 0.01 = 0.001

Our brains work like this, constantly updating our prior assumptions. Part of the reason why frequentist intervals are misinterpreted.

More on Intervals

Frequentist Interval (from PDG[1])





Figure 38.3: Construction of the confidence belt (see text).

Vertical lines = experimental results. Horizontal lines = confidence interval for Θ with area α . The location is controlled by either endpoint convention or significance tests for each point (Likelihood ratio test = Feldman Cousins). For complicated models, monte carlo is used to generate the bands. Bayesian Intervals (source: epixanalytics.com)



Likelihood is the result of experiment $P(x|\Theta) \cdot \pi(x)$ is technically in the denominator but normalization takes care of this. The interval is chosen such that the area under the curve is 1- α . Doesn't satisfy coverage in general, but under certain priors it does.

Even more comparison

Frequentist:

$$\int_{-2\ln\lambda}^{\infty} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}|s) \le \alpha$$

Bayesian:

$$1 - \alpha = \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{s_{\rm up}} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}|s)\pi(s)ds}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}|s)\pi(s)ds}$$

Objective vs. Subjective Bayesian Priors

- Subjective: Use all available information. Wears the cognitive aspects on its sleeves
 - The uncertainties of the experiment are incorporated into the priors, which are then subject to defense.
 - Normalizable by construction.
 - Reflect biases that already exist.
- Objective: priors must be **noninformative**-minimal effect on posterior.
 - Mathematically: flat over areas of high likelihood, small in areas of low likelihood.
 - Ideally, given a certain type of data, everybody agrees on a type of prior, eliminating bias [4].



Source: Michael Kloran, kloran.com

Principles of objective Bayesian Priors [10]:

- Insufficient Reason
- Invariance
- (approximate) Coverage matching
- Maximal missing information
- Coherent
- Robust

Jeffrey's Prior and Fischer Information

- Obj. Bayesians desire a noninformative prior.
- Dependence on reparameterization is considered "informative."
- Prior is given by:

$$\pi(\theta) = \sqrt{\det \mathcal{I}(\theta)}$$

- Where I is the Fischer Information Matrix.
 - Represents the amount of information carried in the data about **O**.
 - Independent of parameterization, π(Θ)= π(Θ²), and the data x, depends only on likelihood function.

$$\mathcal{I}_{ij}(\theta) = E[(\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i} \ln f(\mathbf{x}|\theta))(\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_j} \ln f(\mathbf{x}|\theta))|\theta]$$

Examples:

- Gaussian with mean μ , spread σ :
 - $\circ \quad \text{uniform prior } \pi(\mu) = 1.$
 - π(σ) =1/σ.
- Poisson with rate parameter λ:

$$\pi(\lambda) = 1/\sqrt{\lambda}$$

• Bernoulli Trial with success probability γ:

$$\pi(\gamma) = 1/\sqrt{\gamma(1-\gamma)}$$

Notice that Gaussian and poisson examples are **improper**. This is okay as long as there's a cutoff (introduces bias), or the posterior is proper.

Similarities between Bayesian and Frequentist Values

- Poisson distribution: Uniform prior with a cutoff at Θ = 0 and b = 0 gives the frequentist upper limit (b > 0 yields *conservative* /overcovered limits)
- Symmetry of gaussian function means that flat priors give f(x | Θ) = f(Θ| x) and also correspond to frequentist intervals.
- Interpretation of these differ, and these only coincide for single dimensional parameters.
- Bernstein-von-Mises Theorem:[5] posterior pdf centered around mean is asymptotically identical to the MLE around the true value. Covariance matrices are likewise asymptotically identical.

$$1 - \alpha = \frac{\int_0^{s_{up}} (s+b)^n e^{-(s+b)} ds}{\int_0^\infty (s+b)^n e^{-(s+b)} ds}$$
$$p = 1 - \alpha F_{\chi^2}(2b, 2(n+1))$$
$$s_{up} = \frac{1}{2} F_{\chi^2}^{-1}(p, 2(n+1)) - b$$

Discrepancies between the interpretations

- Bayes Factor: To test different hypothesis, eliminate bias in choice of prior, divide the posteriors of H₀, H₁.
- Jeffrey-Lindley Paradox[3]: Under certain circumstances and choices of prior, the null hypothesis can be rejected by frequentist p-values and accepted under Bayes' factor.
- Not actually a paradox:
 - Can be resolved using objective priors.
 - Frequentist asks: is H_0 consistent with data? Bayesian asks: is H_0 better than H_1 ?


$$B_{ij} = \frac{\int f(\mathbf{x}|\theta_i, H_i) \pi(\theta_i|H_i) d\theta_{\mathbf{i}}}{\int f(\mathbf{x}|\theta_j, H_j) \pi(\theta_j|H_j) d\theta_{\mathbf{j}}}$$

Intermission: Criticism and response of Bayesians

From [9]

Bayesian Criticisms:

- Subjectivity impossible to avoid.
- **Coverage** depends on priors [15].
- There really is one objective reality, not a probability distribution (veers into philosophy).



Bayesian Response:

- Assigning a probability to anything is a good thing.
- Reference priors achieve much (but not all) in the way of objectivity.
- Coverage is an imaginary construction, you can't actually perform an infinite number of identical trials.
- More intuitive interpretation of intervals.
- Bayesian priors exclude unphysical results.

Nuisance Parameters

Nuisance parameters define the systematic uncertainties of the experiment [6]. Any uncertain value that isn't the parameter of interest is by definition a nuisance parameter. A 100% frequentist construction needs to achieve coverage for all values of v.

• Frequentist method: "profile" the nuisances with the profile likelihood ratio method:

$$\lambda_P(heta) = rac{\mathcal{L}(heta, \hat{\hat{
u}})}{\mathcal{L}(\hat{ heta}, \hat{
u})}$$

- $-2ln\lambda_{P}$ Has χ^{2} distribution in the limit of large statistics (Wilk's Theorem).
- Used as a replacement test statistic.
- Numerator (profile likelihood) used as a replacement likelihood in Neyman construction.

Bayesian method: "marginalise" the nuisances.

$$\mathcal{L}_m(\mathbf{x}|\theta) = \int \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x}|\theta, \nu) \pi(\nu) d\nu$$

- Replaces the likelihood in the posterior distribution integral [2].
- Π is the "updated prior" after a calibration run (posterior to that experiment).
- Can also use a test statistic Q in place of **x** to find the distribution (used in hybrid methods-coming up).

Hybrid Bayesian/Frequentist Statistics

- Extended Cousins / Highland method: nuisance parameters are integrated over, then fed into the Neyman Construction (frequentist intervals).
 - Parameters of interest are treated in a frequentist fashion, uninteresting parameters are treated in a Bayesian fashion.
 - Nuisance pdf's are expanded in moments (mean, variance, skew, ...)
 - Performs similarly to Bayesian limits, but is overly conservative.
- CLs Method: Use the replacement test statistic
 - Conservative metric, "modified frequentist."
 - Uses marginalisation over nuisance parameters
 - Asymptotically equivalent to Bayesian limits in single parameter case[7].
 - Prevents problem of setting limits better than experimental sensitivity (s << b).
 - Used in LHC physics and neutrino searches.



 $\frac{p_{s+b}}{1-p_i}$

Cousins-Highland Method




Figure 1: Distribution of limits for the case where the true signal is 1.0, the background is 0, the true efficiency is 1.0, the measurement uncertainty on the efficiency is 10%. The red histogram is the Cousins-Highland method and the blue histogram is a full Bayesian treatment with a flat prior. The peak between 2 and 3 is due to cases with zero observed events. The cases with other number of observed events give broader peaks that merge to form the rest of the distribution.





Figure 4: Coverage as a function of the product of the true efficiency and the true signal. The red points are the Cousins-Highland first order approximation, and the blue points are a full Bayesian treatment with a flat prior. The background is 3.0 and the measurement uncertainty on the efficiency is 10% for all points.


CDF [8]

Sampling posterior: Markov Chain Monte Carlo

- Bayes factor integrals with improper priors often lack analytic solutions and have large dimensionality.
- Solution: numerical integration with **MCMC**.
- Uses the **Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm** to sample the posterior distribution.
 - Start with a sample x.
 - Propose a new sample x' bases on *jumping distribution* Q(x'|x).
 - If posterior f(x' | y) > f(x | y), accept it. Otherwise, accept it with frequency f(x'|y)/f(x|y).
 - Continue until desired trace length filled.
- Issues:
 - Usually start far from minimum. Solution: Throw away the first N samples, called "burn-in."
 - X_n correlated with x_{n+1} , so we "thin" the trace by stepping through in steps of length d.
 - \circ Sometimes the Q(x'|x) is altered on the fly to improve acceptance ratio. "Simulated annealing."
- Implemented in the PyMC package with huge configurability.

MCMC, continued.








Figure 6: Posterior pdf (left two columns) and profile likelihood (right two columns) for flat priors (top row) and log priors (bottom row) for a scan including SM nuisance parameters constraints, collider limits on Higgs and superpartner masses and the WMAP5 CDM abundance determination (PHYS+NUIS+COLL+CDM). The inner and outer contours enclose respective 68% and 95% joint regions for both statistics. The posterior pdf has been smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 1 bin width for display purposes. The cross gives the best-fit point, the filled circle is the posterior mean.

From [16]

Application - Bayesian Blocks

- Selects nonuniform bin widths for histograms.
 - Useful on log plots where be become Poisson-dominated.
- Goes through blocks, maximizes the fitness of the bin edges.
 - Fitness determined through Cash statistic N In λ - λ T, which is similar to χ^2 but works better for low counts/bin.
- A prior on the number of blocks penalizes overfitting.
- "Bayesian" because it iteratively updates the likelihood and has a prior.

Source: [15]

• Implementation found in python package Astro-ML





FIG. 5: Performance of BB algorithm for background-only and signal-only toy datasets.

Application - Kalman Filter

- Imprecise phase space measurements (some uncertainty)
- Use stream of incoming data to predict next step (prior distribution).
 - Underlying Markovian process.
- Compare to reality and update the model (posterior distribution).
- Gets a better idea of state than single measurement precision alone.



Overlap of prediction and sensor estimates in a Kalman filter. Source: bzarg.org.

Summary

- Bayesian statistics uses a differing definition of probability to approach the same problems as classical statistics.
- Has intuitive interpretations of both limits and straightforward handling of nuisance parameters.
- It is subjective, at times mathematically inelegant, and fails to have coverage properties.
- Bayesians say that these aren't really problems, and frequentists have incorporated Bayesian strategies into hybrid methods.



Bibliography

- 1. C. Patrignani *et al.* (Particle Data Group), Chin. Phys. C, **40**, 100001 (2016) and 2017 update.
- 2. E. Gross. LHC Statistics for Pedestrians. Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel.
- 3. Arxiv:1503.04098v1 [math.ST]
- 4. Arxiv:1002.1111v2 [stat.AP]
- 5. Doob, Joseph L. (1949). "Application of the theory of martingales". Colloq. Intern. du C.N.R.S (Paris). 13: 23–27.
- 6. arxiv:1301.1273v1 [physics.data-an]
- 7. arXiv:1404.1340 [stat.ME]
- 8. C. Blocker, "Interval Estimation in the Presence of Nuisance Parameters 2. Cousins and Highland Method", CDF Statistics Committee, 2006.
- 9. S. Schmidt, "Limits in High Energy Physics," Talk given at Terascale Lecture School, 2013
- 10. L. Demortier "Objective Bayesian Statistics for Poisson Processes," CDF memo 2005.
- 11. arXiv:0901.3803 [hep-ex]
- 12. arXiv:hep-ex/0503039
- 13. arXiv:1111.6098 [hep-ph]
- 14. R. Cousins, "Why isn't every physicist a Bayesian?" *American Journal of Physics Teachers* 1995.
- 15. arXiv: 1709.00810 [physics.data-an]
- 16. R. Trotta, F. Feroz, M. P. Hobson, L. Roszkowski and R. Ruiz de Austri, JHEP 0812 (2008) 024 [arXiv:0809.3792 [hep-ph]].